Chain of Antichains: An Efficient and Secure Distributed Ledger
  Technology and Its Applications by Lee, Jinwook & Choi, Paul Moon Sub
Chain of Antichains: An Efficient and Secure Distributed Ledger
Technology and Its Applications
Jinwook Lee ∗
Decision Sciences, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104, United States
Paul Moon Sub Choi †
Ewha School of Business, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 03760, South Korea
Abstract
Since the inception of blockchain and Bitcoin (Nakamoto (2008)), a decentralized-distributed ledger
system and its associated cryptocurrency, respectively, the world has witnessed a slew of newer adap-
tations and applications. Although the original distributed ledger technology (DLT) of blockchain is
deemed secure and decentralized, the confirmation of transactions is inefficient by design. Recently
adopted, directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based distributed ledgers validate transactions efficiently without
the physically and environmentally costly building process of blocks (Lerner (2015)). However, centrally-
controlled confirmation against the odds of multiple validation disqualifies the DAG as a decentralized-
distributed ledger. In this regard, we introduce an innovative DLT by reconstructing a chain of antichains
based on a given DAG-pool of transactions. Each antichain (box) contains distinct nodes whose approved
transactions are recursively validated by subsequently augmenting nodes. The boxer node closes the box
and keeps the hash of all transactions confirmed by the box-genesis node. Designation of boxers and
box-geneses is conditionally randomized for decentralization. The boxes are serially concatenated with
recursive confirmation (boxchain) without incurring the cost of box generation. Rewards (boxcoin) are
paid to the contributing nodes of the ecosystem whose trust is built on the doubly-secure protocol of
confirmation. A value-preserving medium of payment (boxdollar) is among numerous practical applica-
tions discussed herein.
Keywords: distributed ledger technology, decentralization, antichain, boxchain, blockchain, directed
acyclic graph, consensus protocol, stablecoin, cryptocurrency
1 Introduction and our motivation
The original vision of the Internet is to construct a global system of interconnected computer networks. The
Internet has revolutionized the modern society and prosaic activities – we became constantly connected.
Yet, even though we are in the era of shared economies with help of the Internet, the individual service
providers and their central authorities are not as much mutually-beneficial as they can be. For example,
the drivers of shared rides and the hosts of shared accommodation can be better-compensated with more
decentralized discretion. The central authorities of those industries can streamline the ever-increasing costs
of cyber-security by decentralizing their centralized systems with the advent of decentralized-distributed net-
works. Decentralization clearly synergizes all stakeholders of the emerging value chains of shared economies,
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regardless of the size and side of transactions. The conventional centralized mechanism can be decentralized
using the distributed ledger technology (DLT), more colloquially referred as the blockchain technology.
Upon the creation of blockchain by Nakamoto (2008), the DLT has gained dramatic attention over the
last decade among developers, practitioners, and academics alike. The unprecedentedly multiplied market
values of cryptocurrencies, including blockchain-associated Bitcoin, have inspired a bevy of practitioners
and researchers to implement a variety of real-life applications on distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) network
systems. The original blockchain is considered decentralized and secure with recursively serial confirmation.
However, the environmentally and physically arduous process of block building (“mining”) is the root cause
of systemic inefficiency. This causes ramification (“forking”) of cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin. Recently,
directed acyclic graph (DAG)-based distributed ledgers – including Hashgraph (Baird (2016)), IOTA (Popov
(2017)), Byteball (Churyumov (2017)), etc. – have emerged as a new generation of DLTs. A DAG bears the
shape of an irregularly tangled leaf with recursively validating, binomial sub-trees, and it is computationally
efficient without mining. However, a DAG-based DLT typically requires centrally-managed nodes to perform
the final confirmation of transactions and, to the worse, suffers from the odds of double spending.
Our approach to DLT is synthetic: Combine the decentralized and secure features of blockchain with the
efficiency of DAGs. An antichain (“box”) is a set of distinct, unrelated elements (“nodes”) that orthogonally
complements a chain. As a DAG evolves in the original ledger, we synchronously reconstruct a dual ledger
with a chain of antichains (“boxchain”) as a serial concatenation of boxes of nodes that originate from the
underlying DAG. Because a node in the DAG-ledger recursively approves up to two transactions of two
previous nodes, a reflecting box in the dual ledger, in effect, recursively confirms the transactions of the
last box. This doubly-secure consensus protocol is as follows: First, a new node in a box immediately
verifies and validates the approved transactions of the previous node in the box. Second, when the last
node in the box (“boxer,” a light node1) is determined the head node of the box (“box-genesis,” a full
node2) is randomly chosen among good-standing nodes other than the boxer. Third, the box-genesis finally
confirms all validated transactions within the box and keeps the hash of confirmed transactions, followed
by timestamp synchronization with all the previous box-geneses. This means that the box-geneses must
have a copy of the entire network. Such timestamp synchronization also takes place to boxers, which only
keeps hash pointers. At the core of trust, or governance, on the boxchain ecosystem, this consensus protocol
is numerically impossible for a malignant intention of delayed or multiply-validated transactions. While
the original DAG-ledger and the dual ledger synchronize and expand, there is no mining game involved
contributing to the efficiency of the system. In sum, our dual ledger-keeping algorithm is decentralized,
efficient and secure.
Although currently available P2P payment systems appear more facile and expeditious than before, they
can improve significantly with embracement of DLT as both share similarities in chains of digital signatures
of asset transfers and P2P networking, etc. In this sense, e-commerce marketplaces can be an ideal place
to implement the idea and application of DLT. However, a cryptocurrency with volatile market value is not
suitable for usage in payment, and in order for it to serve as a medium of exchange or a store of value, its
value has to be stable or pegged against a fiat currency. In these regards, our DLT provides two distinct
cryptocurrencies: boxdollar, a value-preserving medium of payment or store of value (“stablecoin”); and
boxcoin, a crypto asset. Such a dual-currency system is desirable in sustaining a decentralized-distributed
ledger network with proper incentives as well as expanding the ecosystem for diverse usages of stablecoins.
In case of international payments for merchandise purchases, first and foremost is the highest reliability
and stability – a proper digital currency must be able to function like a fiat money as a useful medium of
exchange and a dependable store of value. Thus, pegging boxdollar to a fiat money (e.g., the U.S. dollar) is
straightforward and intuitive. In order to maintain the reliability and stability of boxdollar, the optimized
rebalancing of currency holdings per various criteria, e.g., Kataoka (1963) “safety first model” or conditional
value-at-risk model, can be considered. Besides, boxdollar can be used as a local currency in a municipality
with stable tax revenues. As the local governments with local stablecoins mutually agree to render them
1A lightweight node (or light client) only references the full node’s copy with less required memory capacity and processing
power.
2Since the mining process (i.e., solving a partial hash inversion problem) is not required in this system, prohibitive computing
equipment is not necessary for the full node, which only requires sufficient data storage capacity.
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compatible, these value-preserving cryptocurrencies may eventually act as quasi-fiat currencies.3
While we need a stablecoin like boxdollar to finance purchases and various transactions, we also view the
distributed ledger system as a society of healthy extent of “greed.” It is not difficult to see that concerns
may be overdone if a society only consists of good-standing, law-abiding participants. However, tantamount
rewards paid out in boxcoin, a crypto asset, are essential for the peers with good-standing track records. In
order to encourage rewarding behaviors, a fair opportunity will be given to every peer to play a vital role in
the system. In our ecosystem, there are two particular positions – the boxer and the box-genesis – to which
any qualified participants can be designated multiple times. Besides, small fees will be charged to issued
transactions to provide more security to the system. Without fees, there can be nonsensical transactions
burdening the efficiency and security of the system. The amount of fees will be from negligible to small,
depending on the matter.4 The mentioned elements such as rewards and fees must be realized instantaneously
upon occurrence of events – giving prompt incentive and motivation to the peers. When the ecosystem gets
larger, more robust and multiplied, it is obvious that the value of its currency will gain given a fixed quantity
of currency in circulation. This possibility of capital appreciation is a great incentive for the peers to abide
by the code of conduct. Given these accounts, we are motivated to build a new distributed peer-to-peer
system with two distinct cryptocurrencies: boxdollar and boxcoin. Boxdollar is a stablecoin for our daily
use while boxcoin is a crypto asset to improve and manage our ecosystem along with all participants’ active
engagement.
The organization of this research is as follows: Section 2 introduces our new idea of the dual ledger-keeping
algorithm, which is based on decomposition of partially ordered sets (DAGs). Based on the primal layer of
a DAG-based ledger, a dual-ledger of boxchain (chain of antichains) is synchronized in the dual layer. A
comparison with existing DLTs and applications is provided. In Section 3 we present the mathematics of our
DLT: the nonhomogeneous Poisson process, combination of multiple transaction flows, and the compound
Poisson distribution. Section 4 provides the models of boxdollar and discusses its potentials in the value
chain, followed by our concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 The dual ledger-keeping algorithm for constructing an effective
and secure distributed ledger
2.1 DAG: distributed system, differences from blockchain, and previous works
A DAG, or acyclic digraph, consists of two entities: vertices and edges, i.e., G = (V, E), which consists of a
set V of vertices (or nodes) and a set E of edges (or directed arcs). An edge is an ordered pair (i, j) meaning
outgoing from vertex i, incoming to vertex j, a pair (j, i) means from vertex j to vertex i. A DAG is deemed
an generalized blockchain because the graph itself is a ledger for storing transactions where each vertex is
intinsically a single block. Note that in this section we use the term DAG and G interchangeably. Besides,
the terms “vertex” and “node” are equivalent – “vertex” will be used when we are more focused on graph
itself and “node” when transaction processes and their related topics are discussed. Some of the notable
differences of a DAG from the original blockchain ideas are as follows:
• The main structure of a blockchain is a single chain that consists of blocks (a chain of blocks) and each
block is a set of multiple transactions. If we look at each transaction as a single block, it is not difficult
to understand that such blocks and their connections can be depicted as a DAG. A DAG can also be
expressed in terms of trees – note that if there are N vertices (or nodes), then there can be at least N
binary trees (see Section 2.2).
• Blockchain is based on synchronous time stamps, while a DAG is built asynchronously operating.
However, our dual-ledger system is updated in a nearly synchronous manner (see Section 2.4.).
3See Section 4 for the discussions and models of boxdollar.
4See Section 2.4.3 for more details of the incentive system.
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• In a DAG there is none to force to separate participants into different categories. On the other hand,
Bitcoin and some other cryptocurrencies justify to maintain two separate types of participants, required
either to issue or to approve transactions. There are no “miners” creating blocks and receiving rewards
in DAG.
Let us briefly mention how a DAG system works as a distributed ledger. Transactions are issued by
nodes and their edges show what previous transactions they approved - users need to approve previous
transactions in order to issue their own transaction. All transactions have its own weight, and in our case
they are all equal to one which is adaptable as the system evolves. Speaking of the approval and the weights,
the validation comes with cumulative addition of weights and it goes to all the connected previous nodes
(i.e., ancestors of the node). Unapproved nodes in a DAG are called “tips.” See Figure 1.
A transaction validation process is simple – A node selects some tips at random and verify their validity
in order to issue its own transaction. It is assumed that the approving nodes checks whether or not the two
connected transactions are conflicting in a diligent and honest manner. Note that this validation is different
from the final confirmation in terms of consensus mechanism. A node even before the first transaction is
called the “genesis.” The genesis node has all tokens created in the beginning of the DAG (no more tokens
will be created) and then send the tokens out to several founder nodes. In order to issue a transaction a
node needs to approve the two tips and solve a cryptographic puzzle (i.e., a hash inversion problem) similar
to those in the Bitcoin blockchain. For more technical details we refer the reader to Churyumov (2017),
Iota (2016), Lerner (2015), NXTFORUM.ORG (2014), etc. Churyumov (2017) and Popov (2017) investigate
many important deterministic and stochastic aspects of the network flows on DAGs, respectively.. We will
discuss both deterministic and stochastic aspects here for improvements of the framework.
Figure 1: Transactions on a DAG. Unapproved, gray nodes are tips.
2.2 DAG, structure of trees and related set representation
We continue to develop and modify the existing cryptocurrency models on the DAG, and more importantly,
how we make the connection between the blockchain and a DAG. We will begin with an introduction of
basic notions and develop such concepts using the system of distinct representatives, i.e., decomposition of
a partially ordered set (poset). A simultaneous creation of an efficient network layer (called the dual-layer)
will follow, and this is the core of our dual-ledger system.
Our space is a DAG G, where vertices (or nodes) designate transactions and edges (or directed arcs)
denote how they are connected – the edge (i, j) means that node i approves node j. In our network system
a node selects exactly “two” tips at random and verify their validity in order to issue its own transaction.
More details are presented after this section. There is another notation we need to define together with
G. N designates the network associated with G, which consists of sub-networks N = {N1, . . . ,NV }, where
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V = |V|. Thus, each network contains a subset of G where a large number of vertices can be included.
However complicated these networks look, there are always starting and ending points, and these are the
latest vertex (the source node) and the genesis (the sink node), respectively.
A DAG is a combination of trees which consist of child nodes and their parent and ancestor nodes. For
a tree, Parent means the predecessor of a node; Child is any successor of a node; Siblings are a pair of nodes
that have the same parent; Ancestor is the set of predecessor; Descendant is the set of successors; Subtree
denotes a node with its descendants.
Remark 1 (Binary Trees). As a node is supposed to approve two previous transactions, it is a binary tree.
It is easy to observe that the whole system can be separated into multiple binary trees. (There at least V
binary trees if the total number of vertices is denoted by V .)
In Section 2.1 we briefly mentioned the basic mechanics of issuing and approving transactions in a DAG.
In connection with trees, if a node v approves two previous transactions then such nodes that issued the
approved transactions become parent-nodes (or parents) of node v. Note that this validation of the parents
automatically approves the parents of that parents, followed by such recursion all the way to the genesis. If
we select a single parent node out of two parent nodes then it forms a chain, i.e, a linearly linked, totally
ordered set. This is very efficient and is regarded as one of the main benefits to manage transactions in a
DAG.
However, there are a typically large number of such chains, which are only partially ordered as there
are incomparable ancestors in terms of subset relation, or validation relation. A DAG is a poset itself.
The multiple chains of a DAG is the main reason why the system is asynchronous, which makes it almost
impossible for all peers to agree to a single version of the truth. This means the final confirmation from a
reasonable consensus mechanism would be unreachable if the network system is solely based in a DAG. This
motivates our dual ledger-keeping algorithm.
Remark 2. A DAG is a poset by subset relation.
Now let us turn our attention to see what happens to a DAG when a node is approved in terms of the
cumulative weight.
Remark 3 (Cumulative weight on a node, a counting measure of integrity and trust). As mentioned earlier,
we assume all nodes have their own weight equal to one. In addition to the references to the parents (by
hashes), the cumulative weight is a good measure for the integrity and trust. By the validation of a single
child node, its all ancestors’ weights will be added exactly by one, which is convenient as a counting measure.
In other words, the weight of a node provides the system with information of the number of child nodes at
the moment. The exact cumulative weight of a node is not known to its neighbors due to the asynchronous
nature of a DAG-based network.
Remark 4 (Inclusion of transaction information on nodes). Note that a child node encompasses its parent
node by referencing its parent’s hash. All information of ancestors (including the genesis) can be obtained
(reference does not take any memory, only point to the location) in a recursive manner, which means that a
child node has more information than its parent nodes.
Speaking of the information inclusion by nodes let us use the following notations:
Tk = {transaction information of node ik}.
Suppose that node i7 approved node i6 and node i5, and node i6 approved node i4 and i3, and node i5
approved nodes i2 and i1 as in Figure 2. Then node i7 can get the information of all 6 previous nodes and
itself (of course), node i6 includes nodes i4, i3 and itself, and node i5 includes nodes i2, i1 and itself. For
k = 1, . . . , 7, let the set Ak designate the union of all ancestor nodes from the point of view of node ik. This
example can be written up as:
A7 = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ · · · ∪ T7,
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A6 = T6 ∪ T4 ∪ T3, A5 = T5 ∪ T2 ∪ T1
and
A1 = T1, A2 = T2, A3 = T3, A4 = T4.
Thus, we have
A7 = T7 ∪A6 ∪A5,
followed by the subset relation
A7 ⊇ A6, A7 ⊇ A5, A6 ⊇ A4, A6 ⊇ A3, A5 ⊇ A2, A5 ⊇ A1, (1)
A5 + A6 and A5 * A6 as they are only partially ordered. This is a simplistic example, but illustrates some
important ordering on components of the network. Refer to Figure 3, where child and parent nodes are
upside down. In a tree graph, it is typical to have child nodes below, but in our special validation operation
child nodes approve the transactions of their parent nodes. Again, the direction of edges are not from the
genesis, but towards it.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Figure 2: Transactions on a DAG. Unappoved, gray nodes are tips. (Compare it with Figure 3.)
Remark 5 (Not a typical binary tree structure). Again, note that the hierarchical relationship in a typical
tree has ancestors above their predecessors. Our case is the opposite due to the selection-approval operation
by a child node. This means, the root of a tree is a common child (the youngest “single” one!) of all the
others. A child is a “superset” of the parent nodes.
Desides, the tree in Figure 3 can be divided into three binary trees (i.e., repeated structural forms as
illustrated), which will help solve a variety of problems in a recursive or iterative manner. We employ such
recursion for our consensus protocol (in Section 2.4.1).
2.3 Primal and dual spaces, and the dual ledger-keeping system
2.3.1 Partially ordered set and its related concepts
In this section we present models and related algorithms making the system more integral, secure and
efficient. We provide some basic definitions and results in connection with posets.
We say that two elements x and y of S are comparable if x ≤ y or y ≤ x, otherwise x and y are
incomparable. If all pairs of elements are comparable then S is totally ordered with respect to ≤. An element
M of S is called a maximal element in S if there exist no x ∈ S such that M ≤ x (i.e., M ≤ x→M = x). An
element m of S is called a minimal element in S if there exist no y ∈ S such that y ≤ m (i.e., y ≤ m→ m = y).
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A7
A6 A5
A4 A3 A2 A1
(a) Hasse diagram on partial order by subset
relation.
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i7
H76
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i4
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i3
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i2
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i1
(b) A set of binary trees with referencing
hash functions.
Figure 3: Inclusion of information in a subset of a DAG of Figure 2
An element G of S is called a greatest element in S if x ≤ G for all elements x of S, and the term least
element is defined dually. A chain (or totally ordered set or linearly ordered set) in a poset S is a subset
C ⊆ S such that any two elements in C are comparable (A chain is a sequence). An antichain in a poset S
is a subset A ⊆ S such that “no” two elements in A are comparable.
Remark 6 (Blockchain is serial, thus totally ordered, while a DAG is only partially ordered.). The main
structure of a blockchain is a series of blocks – it is a serial concatenation of blocks, hence a totally ordered
set. A DAG is only partially ordered and a mixture of piece-wise serial networks, seemingly disorganized. A
DAG can also be restructured in a meaningful way by decomposing a poset into chains and antichains.
It is known that if every chain of a poset S has an upper bound in S, then S contains at least one
maximal element (Zorn’s lemma). If x, y ∈ S, then we say that y covers x or x is covered by y, denoted
xl y or y m x, if x < y and no element u ∈ S satisfies x < u < y. The chain C of S is maximal if it is not
contained in a larger chain of S.
Remark 7. It is desirable that all maximal chains have the same length from the genesis to the corresponding
tips. Typically some of the tips are not in the same antichain.
The size of the largest antichain is known as the poset’s width; The size of the longest chain is known as
the poset’s height. This will be used in (3).
Remark 8. The height is from the genesis to a tip in the most recent antichain.
A poset can be partitioned using chains (see, e.g., Dilworth (1950), Fulkerson (1956), Dilworth (1960),
etc.). A poset can also be partitioned using antichains which is closely related to our formula construction
as shown in Greene and Kleitman (1976). The following theorem is considered self-evident and is presented
without the proof.
Theorem 1 (Dual of Dilworth). Suppose that the largest chain in a poset S has length n. Then S can be
partitioned into n antichains.
Definition 1. A rank function of a poset S is function r : S → {0} ∪ N having the following properties:
(i) if s is minimal, then r(s) = 0.
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(ii) if t covers s (i.e., tm s), then r(t) = r(s) + 1.
Remark 9. In a DAG, the minimal element is the genesis.
Definition 2 (Lee and Pre´kopa (2017)). On a finite poset S with length n, ordered by inclusion, the reverse
rank function ρ : S → {1, . . . , n} is defined by
ρ(E) =
∑
i
1E⊆Mi ,
where E is any element of S and Mi’s are incomparable maximal elements of S. The reverse rank function
ρ(E), a counting measure, returns the number of maximal elements containing E.
Remark 10. In a DAG, tips are the maximal elements.
Theorem 2. Given a finite poset (S,⊆), maxE∈S ρ(E) is the width (i.e, the size of the largest anti-chain)
of a poset and equals to
min
{
m
∣∣ maximal chains C1, . . . , Cm with S = m⋃
i=1
Ci
}
.
Proof. Obvious by Dilworth (1950) and the reverse rank function in Definition 2.
Definition 3 (system of distinct representatives). Suppose that A1, A2, . . . , AN are sets. The family of
sets A1, A2, . . . , AN has a system of distinct representatives if and only if there exist distinct elements
z(1), z(2), . . . , z(N) such that z(i) ∈ Ai for each i = 1, . . . , N .
Theorem 3 (Duality). The minimum number of non-redundant edges from an antichain to its previous one
is equal to the maximum number of distinct representatives in the latter antichain.
2.3.2 A dual layer construction and two essential roles
Based on the aforementioned notions, we present the main algorithm which constructs a new layer on top of
a convoluted, partially ordered DAG. We will decompose a DAG using chains and antichains. The original
DAG is preserved as it normally operates, and there is a dual-layer being constructed almost synchronously
based on subset relation among the nodes on the DAG.
1
2
3
4
7
6
5
10
8
9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Figure 4: Transaction units connected in a DAG whose genesis is node 1.
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Let us consider a DAG of 20 nodes (with four tips of nodes 15, 18, 19, 20) as in Figure 4. The i-th-created
node shows its node number i, i.e, node 1 is the genesis node. Child nodes are the supersets of their parent
nodes. Incomparable nodes form an antichain and the set of incomparable child nodes must be a “cover”
of the set of incomparable parent nodes. In Figure 5, for example, the nodes 8, 9, 10, 11 are included in an
antichain (the third bluebox from the left) since they are mutually incomparable. The “union” of those four
nodes (i.e., antichain) include the “union” of nodes 5, 6, 7 (i.e, antichain) – no single node among the four
nodes 8, 9, 10, 11 include all three nodes 5,6,7 as a node can only approve two previous nodes.
As described in Figure 5, by the decomposition using antichains, any entangled DAG can be restructured
into a linked list (i.e., a chain of blue boxes in Figure 5), resembling a blockchain. For this reason, the
blockchain is considered as a special version of a DAG, which is a generalized blockchain.
Remark 11. We do not change a given DAG to a single chain; Rather, we preserve the original DAG-
based ledger to make the system more secure and trusted. This is the embarkation of our dual ledger-keeping
algorithm.
Specifically, we present a series of descriptions as in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7. Let Bk, k = 1, . . . , 6 denote
the bluebox in Figure 5 from the left to right in order. B1 has elements of nodes 2,3,4, B2 has elements of
nodes 5,6,7, and so on. Then B1 ⊆ B2 ⊆ B3 ⊆ B4 ⊆ B5 ⊆ B6 and B1 l B2 l B3 l B4 l B5 l B6 as a
bluebox covers its most recent and previous one.
1
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20
Figure 5: A series of boxes (antichains) with incomparable units, constructed based on the partial order by
their subset relations.
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Figure 6: A series of boxes (antichains) after redundant edges (approvals) are removed.
In including the most recent previous transaction, if the same address issues multiple transactions (mul-
tiple nodes) then it is desirable to form a single linked list (i.e., a chain or a totally ordered set). Tracking
its own series of transactions will clarify such task 5.
5A rapid succession of the multiple transactions using different addresses is a typical way to attack the system. More details
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Figures 5 and 6 are slightly different: A few number of edges in Figure 5 are missing in Figure 6. One
of the two edges are removed from nodes 8, 9, 17, 20 as some of them are redundant for the sake of the
consistency of the system. Note that node 9 approved nodes 5 and 2, but node 5 approved node 2 earlier.
Node 9’s approval on node 5 means that it automatically approved node 2 as node 5 is the child of node 2.
Node 9 is a child of node 5, so node 9 cannot be a child of node 2 since node 2 is a parent of node 5 – it will
hurt the parent-child relationship. (The nodes 17, 13, 11 are of the same case.).
The approval selections of nodes 8 and 20 are valid but undesirable. They did not approve redundant
transactions and are, thus, harmless in this example. However, in a real situation some idling nodes might
select unnecessary and old transactions that are already approved by many other nodes. This may cause
a higher complexity in a variety of important operations. Further, this may put nonsensical and illogical
cumulative weights on the DAG because it interferes with efficient ordering operation of the system. Selection
of nonsensical transactions does not take place in our dual-ledger system, which will be discussed in Section
2.4.1.
The blue boxes in Figure 6 are the antichains as well as the SDRs (if we see distinct chains from the
nodes). From the geometric perspective, the elements of the most recent antichain can be considered as
vertices of upper bounded orthants in a multidimensional space, and it follows that the earlier antichains’
elements are inside of such orthants.
Note that there is no link among the elements of the same antichain. Let us pick a single node and
appoint it to represent and act for its siblings. The nodes we will choose are the ones that joined their
antichains the latest. In this example, such nodes are 4, 7, 11, 14, 18, 20 and they are all over the place in
a DAG (see Figure 7.). We call them the box-closing-members, or “boxers.”
Remark 12 (The roles of the box-closing-members, or boxers). The roles of the boxers are adaptable as the
system evolves. One of the crucial roles is that they communicate with their siblings, the members of the
same antichain, and broadcast to their siblings if there are some notable changes on the system. Moreover,
there is a boxers’ own network, on which they can efficiently communicate with each other. The network is
just a single chain connected by edges among them, but it is a semi-hidden network since it’s exclusive for
the boxers.
Figure 7: Primal layer: Transaction units in a DAG, our primal space with boxers in blue
The boxes are the antichains and they can be concatenated to form a chain: the chain of antichains.
Individual box-genesis will be denoted by i-genesis (or gi) if it’s inside the i-th box (antichain). The i-genesis
is the child of (i− 1)-genesis and the parent of i+ 1-genesis, and (i+ 1)-genesis is the child of i-genesis and
are discussed in Section 2.4.1.
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Hash Hash Hash Hash
Figure 8: Dual layer: Boxers (in gray) and their siblings in the dual layer, constructed in real time.
the parent of (i+ 2)-genesis, and so on.
genesisl · · ·l (i− 1)-genesisl i-genesisl (i+ 1)-genesisl · · · (2)
There is also a chain (as in the above covering inequalities in (2)) of box-geneses which is the same height
as the whole DAG – The height of a DAG is the size of its longest chain.
Remark 13 (The roles of the box-genesis). The box-genesis (a full-node) is selected among the nodes of
good-standing track records. Once selected, one is responsible to check most recently approved transactions
by its siblings, followed by announcing the final confirmation of their validity. Such transactions are in the
parent-box (most recent previous box). When the final confirmation is placed, the box will finally be closed in
agreement with a boxer and no more validations can be placed. More details are presented in Section 2.4.1.
If the system has a fixed upper bound of the width or size of antichain, say M , and if the total number
of vertices of a given DAG is N , then
the height of the whole DAG is at most dN/Me, (3)
which is a markedly important measure owing to the fact that the system governs the quantity M per Monte
Carlo simulation. Therefore, the quantity of (3) can only be estimated in the primal space. From the dual
space the height of the whole DAG can easily be found, which equals to the number of closed antichains plus
two at most. We will use this measure for further discussions, together with another criterion – the time
constraint τ for each antichain. This is also a vital constraint to control the system. As both M and τ and
their roles are presented in Remark 20, they are both paramount criteria for a boxer selection. The size of
antichain will be determined by the box-closing boxer.
This chain of box-geneses is a network from the latest i-genesis (a root node) to the genesis (a sink node
and the origin), hidden to users, which helps make the system more secure and compact on the dual layer
(in Figure 8). The regular nodes are not informed of such chain unless the need arises. The detailed roles of
the box-geneses are presented in Section 2.4.1.
Simply put, the box-making algorithm is as follows: open the box, examine and put items in the right
packaging boxes, then close the boxes. Using the boxes based on the algorithm detailed below, we construct a
new layer which is a combination of a semi-hidden network and a normal chain. This new layer is a separate
space but it corresponds to the original DAG. This layer will be updated in real time as transactions are
released and validated on the DAG .
We present two algorithms – Algorithm 1 at a fixed point of time and Algorithm 2 in real time. The
following is to show how to fill a box at a specific time point with unassigned nodes. Let Bi denote the
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i-th antichain (box) and V ′i the corresponding set of vertices which approved two previous transactions but
not yet validated by others. Put another way, V ′i is the set of tips, about to issue new, or unvalidated,
transactions.
Algorithm 1 Constructing the i-th box (Bi) at a point of time for i = 1, . . . , n
Suppose the box Bi−1 is full, and V ′i = {vi1 , . . . , vin}.
while there exists v /∈ Bi for every v ∈ V ′ with Bi ∪ {v} do
if v is a cover of the element(s) of Bi−1 then
Bi ← Bi ∪ {v}
V ′i ← V ′i \v
else
V ′i+1 ← V ′i+1 ∪ {v}
end if
end while
Stop; The box Bi has been filled up, let the last v be the boxer. Then the i-th genesis gi is assigned, and
we move on to the next box Bi+1 with V
′
i+1
Remark 14. The box-genesis will be selected among good-standing nodes only after the boxer is determined,
which is an imperative rule to keep the system secure. (see Remarks 22 and 25.)
Remark 15 (Timestamp server). Timestamps form a chain, and each timestamp includes the has of previous
timestamps as in Figure 8.
Remark 16. Each box is identified by a hash, and is linked to its previous box by referencing the previous
box’s hash.
The following is how to build a dual-layer in real time. See Remark 20 for the constraints M and τ for
the size of antichains. A node that approves two previous transactions will be assigned to the corresponding
antichain (based on the partial order).
Algorithm 2 Constructing the antichains in real time (i.e, a single node at a time)
Suppose |Bi| = ki for all i.
if a node v just approved two previous transactions, and is a cover of the element(s) of Bj−1 then
Bj ← Bj ∪ {v}
Update Bj = {v(1)j , . . . , v(kj)j , v(kj+1)j }
end if
Remark 17 (Boxchain on the dual-layer). The dual layer corresponding to the original DAG-based layer
has a chain of antichains (boxchain), which resembles a blockchain since each box consists of transactions
and such boxes are serially linked.
Similar to Bitcoin transactions, in our dual-ledger system most of the conflicts are easily determined if
they are in different antichains (boxes). If they are in different antichains (i.e, totally ordered), the latter
one will be rejected. If suspicious transactions are in the same antichain, their cumulative weights can be
compared. If such transactions happen to have the same weight (same number of descendants), some tie-
break rules can be devised, including a fixed maximum width (the size of the largest antichain), a boxers
role, etc. However useful they appear, robust criteria for final confirmation is necessary to build trust
among participants and maintain systemic sustainability. For this reason, we develop a dominant consensus
mechanism to reach the final stage of agreement which is due to the dual system of both DAG and boxchain
ledgers.
Remark 18 (The dual-ledger system). The dual-ledger system consists of a DAG in primal layer and the
corresponding boxchain in the dual layer.
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2.4 The Chain of Antichains
2.4.1 Consensus protocol for the final confirmation with box-closing, and a subtree problem
As many practitioners and researchers have already pointed out (see, e.g., Popov (2017), Churyumov (2017)
etc.), there can be a myriad of subtrees, and as a result, a DAG can be extremely wide and inefficient in
terms of the final confirmation possibilities. In Figure 9, there is no path from some latter blue nodes (good-
standing nodes) to red nodes (malignant ones). With subtrees, nonsensical transactions can be “issued and
approved” by the group of red nodes in the absence of prior investigation of the validity of transactions.
This is a major obstacle to reaching a “consensus” on the validity of previous transactions, which is critical
in any distributed peer-to-peer system.
Figure 9: Main subtree in blue vs. dishonest subtree in red. (tips are in gray.)
A subtree can occur haphazardly in a DAG, which is prone to unproductive behaviors. Regardless of
the intention of forming a subtree, it is imperative to equip a channel to verify the validity of transactions
from subtrees. This can be done at the algorithm-design level of the consensus mechanism of reaching
decentralized final confirmation of already-approved transactions.
A subtree can take place anytime and a subtree always exists in a DAG, which renders negative behaviors
possible. Whether it’s formed by a good-will or not (by a good citizen or by a malicious attacker), there
must be a way to check transactions’ validity from subtrees. Allow us to present what can be done by our
particular algorithm regarding a consensus mechanism. This is about reaching a final state of agreement
from the peers – the final confirmation of already-approved-transactions.
The main process of our consensus protocol is as follows. For the final confirmation of transactions of box
(antichain) Bi−1, it is required to reach agreement among the peers in the next box Bi. This means, a final
confirmation process for Bi−1 initiates when the boxer of Bi is selected. To join Bi a node must approve
at least one node from Bi−1. Thus, the formation of a box is totally based on what transactions the node
approved.
Remark 19 (The rule for the tip selection, or transaction selection and validation)). The users are recom-
mended to select most recent transactions. We use the rank function (in Definition 1) for this rule as the
following.
r(vk) ≤ r(vk+1) ≤ r(vk) + 1, (4)
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where vk denotes a node that just finished its transaction validation right before vk+1’s completion of
validation. The inequality (4) is equivalent to:
vk ∈ Bi −→ vk+1 ∈ Bi or Bi+1. (5)
Once the final confirmation process begins, a later node can no longer select and approve transactions from
the corresponding box whose transactions are being checked.
(a) Primal layer: a DAG
Hash Hash Hash Hash
(b) Dual layer: a boxchain (chain of antichains)
Figure 10: The dual ledger-keeping. Boxers are in blue in both layers; box-geneses are in pink in the dual
layer.
The final confirmation will be placed on each box by its child box (the next neighboring box, or cover).
Again, the final confirmation process for Bi−1 begins when the boxer of Bi is selected. We, thus, list below
the following dual-criteria for boxer selection.
Remark 20 (Criteria for a boxer selection).
• Cardinality: As mentioned in (3), the size of antichains can be determined by the number of nodes.
Let M denote the upper limit of the number of elements of the i-th box (Bi). Then we write |Bi| ≤M .
If we only take this into account for a boxer selection, then the Mth node in Bi will be designated as
the boxer.
- For security purpose, M will be selected as follows. Recalling the principle of the inversion method,
we compute the value M = F−1X (p), where F is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of any
discrete random variable X (or a discretized continuous random variable), l ≤ X ≤ u where l and u
are both positive integers; and p the generated random number around the uniform distribution on
[0, 1]: It is known that if U is a uniform (0,1) random variable, then with a given c.d.f.F , F−1(U) is a
random variable.
• Duration: Let the time τ denote the acceptable and agreeable time-limit (e.g., 20 seconds) for a user
to wait until the final confirmation. Note that the average time until the final confirmation would be
about 1.5τ. (See Remark 26 for details.) Suppose that the first node vi1 of box Bi comes in at time
t = s. In other words, at time t = s a node vi1 just finished its validation of two previous transactions
in Bi−1 (or one in Bi−1 and another one in Bi−2). Suppose that a node vik finishes the validation of
two previous transactions at time t ≤ s+ τ , with the next one vik+1 completing its approvals at time
t > s+ τ . Then the node vik will become the boxer and vik+1 will be the first member of Bi+1. In fact
the node vik+1 cannot select any transactions from Bi−1 by (5).
- No more nodes can be added to the box after whichever criterion is met earlier. The final confirmation
process needs to get started when a boxer is selected.
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- Exception: If the size M is reached at beyond allowable speed (i.e., in case that incoming transactions
are extremely frequent than normal), the time constraint will be used. This is to keep the system safe
from possible attacks. (see Section 2.4.2).
Note that the size of boxes (antichains) depends on the boxer selection problem as in Remark 20. Trans-
actions issued by the members of Bi−1 are approved by the members of Bi, but they are just individual
validations. We need a strong consensus protocol in order to place the final confirmation of entire set of
transactions of the previous box.
Algorithm 3 The final confirmation of the transactions in Bi−1, conducted by Bi
Step 1. Once the box Bi’s size becomes M or time is up (≥ τ), i.e., Bi is full,
the i-genesis (gi) starts to check its siblings’ validations (i.e., validity of transactions of Bi−1).
Step 2. If all transactions of Bi−1 are legitimate based on the consensus protocol (below), go to Step 4.
Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3. Disable the nodes with illegal transactions in Bi−1, and report it to the genesis group.
Disable all nodes in Bi that approved such illegal nodes.
Step 4. The final confirmation is placed by the gi.
Bi−1 is closed and marked “true,” and every transaction issued in Bi−1 becomes final,
followed by the timestamp synchronization with all the previous box-geneses.
Therefore, the whole boxchain (chain of antichains) is marked “true” in a recursive way. Note that there
is another recursion inside each box as in the following consensus mechanism.
Consensus protocol in a dual recursion
• The 2+2 process in recursion:
When a node approves two previous transactions it will be added to a box as in the Algorithm 2. As
the node joins the box, it is automatically augmented to the last node in the box and is required to
check the validity of transactions approved by the neighboring node. This process continues recursively
from the second to the last node (boxer) of the box. Simply put, each node checks its prior neighbor’s
approvals upon arrival. This is a dual validation process for every node conducted both in primal and
dual layers.
• Final confirmation by the box-genesis:
The final confirmation of recent transactions will be made by the box-genesis as presented in Algorithm
3. This role resembles that of miners’ of Bitcoin, and such validation process is conducted by the box-
genesis that only exists in the dual layer. Rewards are given to a box-genesis when the final confirmation
is placed.
The final confirmation is placed when the consensus protocol is completed. The box-genesis broadcasts
the termination of validation process to all other members. In our peer-to-peer system anyone can take such
role (not the miners vs. the rest) as long as one shows a good track-record.
Remark 21 (The box-genesis group membership eligible to good-standing nodes). The roles of box-genesis
is crucial to keeping our ecosystem healthy and secure. Excellent history of positive behavior is required for
peers to renew this membership and new members with outstanding track-records can also be selected. The
box-genesis among the leaders of consensus protocol, and this position is open to everyone but follows a
random assignment process.
Remark 22 (Random assignment process). The members of a box-genesis group are not totally trusted even
though they qualify – its box assignment is completely random with some conditions, and not known to the
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box-genesis until the last node of box (boxer) is determined. After the boxer is selected the box genesis will
be appointed by a random selection among the nodes other than the boxer.
Remark 23 (Boxer’s role for dual safety). The boxer is the one communicating with its siblings (nodes of
the box), together with other boxers. However, the final confirmation of validations of previous transactions
must be determined solely by a box-genesis. For dual safety, the boxer keeps the final confirmation from the
box-genesis in check. Some rewards are given to the boxer.
Remark 24. As we discussed, our recursive consensus mechanism can perform well in terms of both ef-
ficiency and scalability. This consensus protocol is unique – in our dual-ledger ecosystem there are no
heterogeneous peer groups. Anyone qualified and “lucky” node can play a vital role in the system, e.g., as
a box-genesis or as a boxer. It is easy to see that more active peers will have higher chances to get more
rewards.
2.4.2 Possible attack to the system and its success probability
A double-spending attack can cause a serious integrity violation in any distributed peer-to-peer system.
Although our recursive validation and final confirmation systems are robust, every possible attack needs
to be accounted for in order to keep the network safe. A possible and worst-case attack scenario can be
imagined as follows. Suppose that a malicious and affluent party attempts to take over the system over
some time-window by issuing an immense number of transactions almost simultaneously with all different
addresses. In our dual ledger-keeping system, a complete dominance over a pair of back-to-back boxes
(antichains) including the box-geneses and the boxers is necessary for a meaningful damage to transactions.
From the attacker’s perspective, the favorable event is that there are no other transactions issued while
two consecutive boxes are formed. Suppose that a time constraint τ (in Remark 20) is used for a single box-
closing. For simplicity we also assume that the transaction arrivals follow a homogeneous Poisson process.
More detailed and realistic, nonhomogeneous compound Poisson processes, etc. are covered in Section 3. It
is known that the corresponding inter-arrival times are i.i.d. exponential random variables with the same
parameter λ of the Poisson process (the average number of transactions in a given unit time). Let a random
variable W denote the time until the next transaction, which follows an exponential distribution with a p.d.f.
f(x) = λe−λx, x ≥ 0. Then the following can be written:
p = P (no transactions while two boxes are formed) = P (W > 2τ) = e−2λτ . (6)
Suppose that the system had set a time limit τ of 20 seconds (1/3 minute) for the final confirmation process.
Assuming the average number of transactions per minute is 30 (i.e., λ = 30), we have
p = P (W > 2(1/3)) = e−2(30)(
1
3 ) ≈ 0.000000002061. (7)
For a more speedy final confirmation process, let τ = 10 seconds with the same λ = 30.
p = P (W > 2(1/6)) = e−2(30)(
1
6 ) ≈ 0.00004539, (8)
which is still a sufficiently slim chance. The results clearly demonstrate the following.
• More transactions will lower the probability of a successful attack, i.e., λ ↑=⇒ p ↓ .
• A longer box-closing interval also brings down the chance of a successful attack, i.e., τ ↑=⇒ p ↓ .
Note that the number of transactions will be sizable in a booming e-commerce marketplace, which makes
it enables a very speedy final confirmation process. With this reasoning, let us consider another case, e.g.,
say 100 transactions per minute on average (i.e., λ = 100). Then our time constraint τ can be selected
so that the probability of the attacker’s favorable event is kept negligible. Let us put an upper bound of
p = 0.000001 (one out of a million) on a successful attack chance. Then we can find τ using
P (W > 2τ) = e−2(100)τ ≤ 0.000001, (9)
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followed by
τ ≥ ln(0.000001)−200 ≈ 0.06907755 minutes, (10)
which is about 4.14465316 seconds. This means that if we put on a 5 second rule for the time constraint
τ then the attacker’s success probability would be less than 0.000001 (again, τ ↑=⇒ p ↓). If it still seems
possible, note that we have a series of box-genesis (two different ones) in the associated back-to-back boxes
and they are independent of transactions.
Remark 25. Together with a random selection of the box-genesis, the probability of successful attack would
be almost zero in any case.
Detailed stochastic aspects of transaction flows will be discussed in Section 3, where one can find more
general and useful ideas about how to analyze related random processes.
Remark 26 (Average time until the final confirmation). It is about 1.5τ which is the average of τ < T < 2τ .
The actual amount of time until the final confirmation for a singe transaction (or a node) is varied
depending on the time point when the node joined its corresponding box. Such waiting time until the final
confirmation is τ < T < 2τ since the final confirmation is made by the next neighboring box (child box).
Note that it takes τ to form a single box. It is not hard to see that if a node is the first member of a box,
its transaction’s final confirmation time would be approximately 2τ since two more boxes need to be closed.
In case of a boxer, the confirmation time will be about τ. Recall that the transactions are already approved
by their child nodes in a DAG, and therefore our consensus protocol in the dual layer can place a powerful
final-confirmation.
Remark 27. In the dual layer, we have a chain of antichains (boxchain) and each antichain (box) consists
of a single chain. This means we have a total order in the dual layer and obviously any conflicting nodes
can easily be checked.
Let us finalize this section by supporting Remarks 19 and 20 which enable the following.
• No purely random approvals of tips - a lazy user can approve a fixed pair of old transactions
• Inclusion in a more recent antichain, followed by a 2+2 validation process.
• In case that a new legitimate transaction is not approved and waits longer than the formation of two
new boxes, an empty transaction will be issued as a series. But it still needs to select and approve
another node to issue the same transaction in order to get a validation by others. Note that such
empty transaction contributes to the network’s security.
• M - the width constraint for antichain: This will be determined by the frequency of transaction flows
(see Section 3 for more details about a random transaction flow).
• τ - the time constraint for antichain: We do not wait until the box is filled up to the given limit
M . Recall: If the size M is reached at beyond allowable speed (incoming transactions are extremely
frequent than normal), the time constraint had better be used. This is to keep the system safe from
the worst case scenario we just studied.
2.4.3 Incentive system with proper rewards and fees
Proper rewards and fees are essential to keep a distributed peer-to-peer network at a desirable status. Note
that in Bitcoin “mining” is the incentive mechanism for decentralized security. Our incentive device is for
every participant as a mixture of rewards for contribution and fees for usage. The fees in our ecosystem are
minimal but serve as an important obstacle to nonsensical orders. Below are the possible cases for rewards.
Rewards are given to such user(s) who
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• put legitimate validations in the DAG-based primal layer.
• put legitimate validations in the boxchain-synchronizing dual layer.
• complete the job as a box-genesis
• complete the job as a boxer
• report abnormal events
Recall that the appointment as a boxer or a box-geneis is conditionally at random – any qualified user can
play these roles multiple times (as mentioned preciously, e.g., see Remarks 12, 13, 21, 22). It is not difficult
to see that more active and honest participation will increase the chance to take such positions and receive
more rewards, which could end up with more rewards than fees. Fees are paid whenever a transaction is
issued. This incentive system is certainly beneficial to both users and the whole ecosystem. Good citizenship
is crucial for our purely distributed peer-to-peer system as much as any type of society is in need of.
2.4.4 Our dual ledger-keeping system, boxchain compared with others
The main structure of a blockchain is a single serial link of blocks (hence the name) and each block consists
of transactions, therefore the blockchain is a totally ordered set. If we look at each transaction as a single
block, there is no longer a single chain; Rather, we see very disorganized, myriads of intertwined blockchains.
This generalized blockchain and can be depicted as a DAG, consisting of a set of vertices (transactions) and
a set of edges (issue and validation of transactions). The transactions in a DAG are only partially ordered.
Indeed, the validation process in a DAG is very efficient and relatively but not as much secure as in the
original blockchain. Considered a third generation blockchain after Ethereum as the second, which emerged
after blockchain, a number of developers have recently released DAG-based distributed ledgers, associated
cryptocurrencies, and applicable payment systems, led by IOTA, Hashgraph, etc.
Irregular and partially ordered DAGs can be reshaped into a more compact form using the discrete
mathematical notions of chains, antichains, and SDRs. This idea, coupled with a doubly-secure confirmation
protocol, has inspired our dual ledger-keeping system, which is partially based on Lee (2017), Lee et al.
(2017), Lee and Pre´kopa (2017). While preserving the DAG-based ledger, we build another ledger with
a chain of antichains to structurally resemble the original blockchain. As a result, along with an effective
consensus protocol, our boxchain is an efficient, secure, and decentralized DLT.
Bitcoin IOTA Box Protocol
Usage Payment Used for IoT applications Payment
Finality Yes No Yes
Confirmation
10 minutes at least 2 minutes (validation)
30 seconds on average if τ = 20 seconds
time (depending on the values of τ and λ)
Transaction fees 0.001 BTC None Tiny or none (if rewards are given)
TPS 7 1000 5000
Decentralization Yes No Yes
Security high low high
Table 1: Brief Comparison of Bitcoin, IOTA and Box Protocol
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3 Stochastic models of the dual ledger-keeping system
3.1 A nonhomogeneous Poisson process - practical assumptions on the fre-
quency of transactions
Unlike some of the assumptions made in Popov (2017), we suppose that X(t) is a nonhomogeneous P.P.
(Poisson Process), where {λ(t), t ≥ 0} is a stochastic process itself. This is because we believe that trans-
actions’ frequency can be varied over certain time periods (e.g., there might be more transactions in the
middle of night). For the sake of completeness, allow us to present some basic concepts first. Stochastic
process can simply be called “one-parametric family” of random variables X(t), t ∈ T . For example, in
case of Markov Chains we have T = {0, 1, 2, . . . }. In our case we suppose T = {t | t ≥ 0}, which means
“time” (mathematically it is nothing but nonnegative half of the real line). The following is well known.
X(t), t ≥ 0 is a homogeneous Poisson process if it has two properties: (i) X(t) has independent increments,
i.e., for 0 ≤ t0 < t1 ≤ t2 < t3 ≤ · · · ≤ t2n−1 < t2n, X(t1) − X(t0), X(t3) − X(t2), . . . , X(t2n) − X(t2n−1)
are independent random variables; (ii) For s ≥ 0, t > 0, the random variable has Poisson distribution with
parameter λt,
P (X(s+ t)−X(s) = k) = (λt)
k
k!
e−λt, k = 0, 1, . . . ,
which follows that E(X(s + t) −X(s)) = λt and var(X(s + t) −X(s)) = λt. Poisson process is a random
event process, e.g., transactions occur in the system (our case), customers arrive to a store, cars arrive to a
gas station, etc. λ is the expected number of such random events in unit time.
For nonhomogeneous Poisson process, Condition (ii) only needs to be changed. Instead of a constant
rate lambda we assume that there exists a nonnegative function λ(u), u ≥ 0 such that for s < t X(t)−X(s)
has Poisson distribution with parameter ∫ t
s
λ(u)du,
which means the parameter depends on time interval. This assumption is crucial in our business because
our data set shows some clear trends in frequency of transactions (and their sizes as well). λ(u) is called
“event density” (in our case, transaction density) because in the interval (t, t+ ∆t)∫ t+∆t
t
λ(u)du ≈ λ(t)∆t
is the expected number of events.
Example 1 (Transaction Density from Data Set). Suppose that the following transaction density (or event
density) are found from recent data set (unit time = 1 hour).
λ(u) =
 2u, 0 ≤ u ≤ 12, 1 ≤ u ≤ 2
4− u, 2 ≤ u ≤ 4.
For simplicity, we are interested only in the time interval [0, 4]. We want to calculate
(i) the probability that two transactions occurred during the first two hours,
(ii) the probability that two transactions occurred during the second two hours.
For (i), we need to calculate the event density, say µ, of the first two hours:
µ =
∫ 2
0
λ(u)du =
∫ 1
0
λ(u)du+
∫ 2
1
λ(u)du =
∫ 1
0
2udu+
∫ 2
1
2du = 1 + 2 = 3.
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Thus, P (X(2) = 2) = 3
2
2! e
−3 = 0.2240. For (ii), we have:
P (X(4)−X(2) = 2) =
(∫ 4
2
λ(u)du
)2
2!
e−
∫ 4
2
λ(u)du =
(∫ 4
2
(4− u)du
)2
2!
e−
∫ 4
2
(4−u)du =
22
2!
e−2 = 0.2707.
Remark 28 (Doubly stochastic Poisson processes). A nonhomogeneous Poisson process with the rate func-
tion {λ(t), t ≥ 0} – it is a stochastic process itself – is called a “doubly stochastic Poisson process.” This is a
great fit for applications which have “dependent” process increments, e.g., some seasonal products, and new
IT products (with business cycles, replaced by newer products), etc.
The simplest doubly stochastic process (sometimes called a mixed Poisson process) has a single random
variable θ with X ′(t) = X(θt), where {X(t), t ≥ 0} is a Poisson process with λ = 1. Given θ, X ′ s a Poisson
process of constant rate λ = θ, but θ is random (unobservable, typically). If θ is a continuous random
variable with p.d.f. f(θ), the marginal distribution is as follows.
P (X ′(t) = k) =
∫ ∞
0
(θt)ke−θt
k!
f(θ)dθ.
3.2 Some important random behaviors regarding transaction interarrival times
in a Poisson process
It is well known that inter-arrival times, let’s say S0, S1, . . . , are i.i.d. exponential random variables with
parameter λ, where λ is the parameter of the Poisson process. Let Wn denote the time of occurrence of the
nth event (setting W0 = 0). The differences Sn = Wn+1 −Wn are the duration that the Poisson process
sojourns in state n. See Figure 11 for description, where S0, S1, . . . denote the inter-arrival times in a Poisson
process and W1 = S0,W2 = S0 + S1, . . . represent the occurrence times of the random events in a Poisson
process.
0
S0
W1
S1
W2
S2
W3
S3
W4
S4
W5
S5
W6 · · ·
· · ·
Figure 11: Interarrival times of transactions - exponential random variables in the Poisson process.
We present the following theorems without proofs (see some stochastic models literature for more details).
Theorem 4. Conditioned on N(t) = n, i.e., N(t) = N((0, t)) = number of events in (0, t), the random
variables W1, . . . ,Wn have joint p.d.f.:
g(t1, . . . , tn) =

n!
tn
if 0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn
0 elsewhere
The above theorem tells us that if conditioned on the number of events up to t, i.e., N(t) = n, then the
n points behave as n independent random points, each chosen from (0, t), according to uniform distribution.
Theorem 5. Probability density function of sum of n independent, exponentially distributed random variables
with the same parameter λ: X = X1 + · · ·+Xn, where Xi, i = 1, . . . , n have the p.d.f. f(x) = λe−λx, x ≥ 0.
Let fn(x) be the p.d.f. of X. Then, for n = 1, 2, . . . , we have
fn(x) =
λnxn−1e−λx
(n− 1)! , x ≥ 0.
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It follows that another derivation of probability distribution for interarrival times of transactions. Let
Fn(t) = P (S0 + · · ·+ Sn−1 ≤ t). Then we have, using Theorem 5,
Fn(t) =
∫ t
0
fn(u)du =
∫ t
0
λnun−1e−λu
(n− 1)! du.
Furthermore, for n ≥ 1,
Pn(t) = P (N((0, t)) = n) = Fn(t)− Fn+1(t)
=
∫ t
0
λnun−1e−λu
(n− 1)! du−
∫ t
0
λn+1une−λu
n!
du
=
[
λnune−λu
n!
]t
0
+
∫ t
0
λn+1une−λu
n!
du−
∫ t
0
λn+1une−λu
n!
du
=
(λt)n
n!
e−λt.
(11)
Note that Fk(t) means the probability that there are at least k transactions. It follows that Pn(t) =
(λt)n
n!
e−λt
for n = 1, 2, . . . and this implies P0(t) = e
−λt. See our related application below.
Example 2 (Expected total boxcoin in time (0, t)). Suppose that transactions occur in the system according
to a Poisson process. Upon making a transaction each user pay 1 boxcoin. Find the expected total sum
collected in (0, t), discounted back to time 0. Let β be the discount rate. Note that the reason of discounting
is to perform more accurate comparison, especially for different time periods.
In case of continuous compounding β is divided by n and then n→∞. The result is
lim
n→∞
(
1 +
β
n
)n
= eβ .
The discounting factor is its reciprocal value e−β . Discounting from time Wk back to initial time 0, the
result is e−βWk . We want to calculate the expected total boxcoin in a given time as follows.
E
X(t)∑
k=1
e−βWk
 = ∞∑
n=1
E
X(t)∑
k=1
e−βWk
∣∣X(t) = n
P (X(t) = n)
=
∞∑
n=1
nE(e−βW1)P (X(t) = n)
=
∞∑
n=1
n
∫ t
0
1
t
e−βuduP (X(t) = n)
=
1
βt
(1− e−βt)
∞∑
n=1
nP (X(t) = n)
=
λ
β
(1− e−βt).
(12)
It is well known that if X1, . . . , Xn are i.i.d. exponential random variables, then X1 + · · · + Xn ∼
Gamma(n, µ), which has the p.d.f.
f(x) = µe−µx
(µx)n−1
(n− 1)! , (13)
where (n − 1)! = Γ(n) because Γ(n) = ∫∞
0
e−yyn−1dy and Γ(n) = (n − 1)Γ(n − 1). Its expectation and
variance are E(X) = n/µ,Var(X) = n/µ2, respectively. Note that the gamma distribution is log-concave,
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so we can formulate a convex optimization problem using some stochastic optimization techniques.
Gamma distribution, a family member of logconcave distributions. If µ = 1 of (13), then the
distribution is said to be standard. If ξ has gamma distribution, then nξ has standard gamma distribution.
Both the expectation and the variance of a standard gamma distribution are equal to n. An m-variate gamma
distribution can be defined in the following way. Let A be the m × (2m − 1) matrix the columns of which
are all 0-1 component vectors of size m except for the 0 vector. Let η1, . . . , ηs, s = 2
m − 1 be independent
standard gamma distributed random variables and designate by η the vector of these components. Then we
say that the random vector
ξ = Aη
has an m-variate standard gamma distribution.
3.3 Combining nonhomogeneous Poisson processes of transactions
Multiple transaction inflows into the system must be well analyzed in order to help monitor overall activity of
the system. Let us begin with the simplest case and extend to the generality. Let X1(t) and X2(t) be the two
Poisson flows with parameter λ1 and λ2, respectively. We also assume that they are independent. Consider
nonoverlapping intervals: (t0, t1) and (t2, t3). Then X1(t1) − X1(t0) and X1(t3) − X1(t2) are independent,
and X2(t1)−X2(t0) and X2(t3)−X2(t2) are also independent. Since the two processes are also independent,
the four random variables are independent. It follows that X1(t1)−X1(t0) +X1(t3)−X1(t2) and X2(t1)−
X2(t0) + X2(t3) − X2(t2) are independent. Thus, we can say that X(t) = X1(t) + X2(t) has independent
increments. Note that
X(s+ t)−X(s) = X1(s+ t)−X1(s) +X2(s+ t)−X2(s),
where Xi(s+ t)−Xi(s) has Poisson parameter λit, i = 1, 2. Hence X(s+ t)−X(s) has Poisson distribution
with parameter (λ1 + λ2)t.
The procedure is the same in the general case. We can unite arbitrary finite number of independent Pois-
son process: if X1(t), . . . , Xn(t) are independent Poisson processes with parameters λ1, . . . , λn, respectively,
then X(t) = X1(t) + · · ·+Xn(t) is a Poisson process with parameter λ1 + · · ·+ λn.
3.4 Transaction “size”, and the recursive formulas for the probability mass
function of compound random variables
Transactions are randomly occurring events. Since a number of events occurring in a fixed period of time,
say N , is uncertain, it would be suitable to use a compound distribution modelling for a random sum
S = X1 + X2 + · · · + XN , where N is a nonnegative integer-valued random variable. For the frequency of
transactions, let N(t) be a Poisson process with a fixed rate λ, for simplicity. It is not a problem, however,
if the Poisson parameter λ is also uncertain as discussed in the previous sections.
If we need to consider the magnitude (or size) of transactions but their sizes are random (or unknown),
it is suitable to use a compound Poisson process. The following is well-known (Greenwood and Yule (1920)):
N ∼ Poisson(λ), where λ ∼ Gamma(r, p/(1− p))→ N ∼ NegBinomial(r, p),
which means that if the Poisson parameter λ is uncertain due to the behavior of heterogeneous users, a
gamma distribution may be suitable for capturing the λ information. Then N will have a negative binomial
distribution. Negative binomial distributions can be used for our model with no problem, but we restrict
ourselves to the compound Poisson distribution for this paper.
The frequency of transactions plays a central role and in our view, the size of transactions would also
be very important to proper management of a DAG. For the transaction size, we let X1, X2, . . . denote
independent, identically distributed random variables (meaning the transaction sizes at the corresponding
events), which are also independent of the Poisson process. (i.e., the random variables N,X1, X2, . . . are
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mutually independent.) Then S(t) =
∑N(t)
k=1 Xk,∀t ≥ 0 (i.e., S(t) is a compound random variable) means
the aggregate transaction weight in time interval (0, t). It is well known that E(S(t)) = λtµ, var(S(t)) =
λt(σ2 + µ2) if µ = E(Xk), σ
2 = var(Xk), k = 1, 2, . . . .
In order to calculate the distribution of aggregate transaction weights we use Panjer’s recursion formula
(see for details, e.g., Panjer (1981), Panjer and Willmot (1986), Dickson (1995), Bowers et al. (1997), etc.).
For completeness, allow us to present here some basic notions and related formulas. The size Xk can be fitted
with continuous or discrete distributions, but the continuous distribution needs to be discretized for the use
of Panjer’s recursion formula. This is a great fit for our model because every transaction has a positive
integer (its weight). For practical discretization methods we refer the reader to the literature, e.g., Panjer
and Lutek (1983) and Dickson (1995). We restrict our attention to the case that the transaction size Xk
follows a discrete distribution on the positive integers because a continuous variable needs to be discretized
to use the recursion formula and also because any positive integer-valued variables can easily be scaled to
the suitable size. Then S is also distributed on the nonnegative integers, and the probability mass function
of the compound process S(t) can be calculated recursively by the following well-known recursion:
P (S(t) = k) =
1
k
λ
k∑
i=1
iP (X1 = i)P (S(t) = k − i). (14)
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Figure 12: Illustration of Compound Poisson Distributed Transactions. Hj is the number of events incurred
over the period j and the unit transaction size is one boxcoin.
Given a Poisson process Nj(t) and nonnegative integer-valued random transaction size Xjk’s for the
upcoming time periods j, j = 1, . . . ,M , we can write:
P (Nj(t) = x) =
(λjt)
x
x!
e−λjt, x = 0, 1, . . . ; j = 1, . . . ,M
Sj(t) = Xj1 +Xj2 + · · ·+XjNj(t), j = 1, . . . ,M,
(15)
where Xjk is the kth transaction size in the jth process. See Figure 12 for description.
Let fj(x) = P (Sj(t) = x), where x is a positive integer. Then, the recursion formula for the p.m.f
fj(x), j = 1, . . . ,M can be written as:
fj(x) =
λj
x
x∑
k=1
kpj(k)f(x− k), x = 1, 2, . . . ,
fj(0) = e
−λj , j = 1, . . . ,M,
(16)
where pj(k) = P (Xj1 = k).
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4 Models and discussions for boxdollar
4.1 Background of boxdollar
Boxdollar (BXD), a value-preserving medium of payment, store of value, or stablecoin, will be used primarily
as a useful medium of exchange as well as a dependable store of value. The value of BXD is at a fixed exchange
rate one to one to a fiat currency, hence boxdollar is a fiat money-backed asset and keeps its stability. The
goal of analytical models of boxdollar is twofold currency conversion and currency rebalancing problems.
These models are well known, and therefore we list up a few models in this section. A variety of useful
optimization models for financial applications, which can be found in the operations research literature (see,
e.g., Pre´kopa (1995), Pflug (1996), Shapiro et al. (2009), etc.).
P2P payments are among impactful applications due to the similarity of operations and transactions on
a decentralized system structure: They have chains of digital signatures of asset transfers, P2P networking,
etc. Yet, most of P2P platforms are not fully utilizing the “purely” distributed system. There are numerous
of P2P platforms which made it easier and faster to make payments, send or receive funds. They provide us
with clearly better solutions than traditional systems in most aspects, even with lower fees and costs. Still,
their pricing and operating models could be more efficient and secure by the blockchain technology, which
may lead us to find a more perfect solution.
Most of existing cryptocurrencies are not accepted in regular market places due to their high volatility.
Holding some cryptocurrency is extremely risky, so the current forms of cryptocurrencies are not suitable
to use in our daily life. It follows, therefore, the price stabilization is the key to the application of a
cryptocurrency. A cryptocurrency, with guaranteed price stability, will clearly be beneficial. The electronic
commerce (or e-commerce) industry is where one can find it suitable to apply the blockchain technology
and cryptocurrency to its existing P2P payment system. Most of successful e-commerce marketplaces have
flexible and adaptable structure, and more importantly, with less regulation but higher potential. For this
reason, the e-commerce is a great t for incorporating the ideas of cryptocurrency and its related applications.
At this moment the e-commerce market transactions are mostly based on at currencies, while there has been
a serious need of instantaneous transactions and borderless transfer-of-ownership. Yet, there is a variety of
difficulties in the international transfer, which often challenges tracking, and normally requires more time
(than domestic) with higher cost to exchange, various fees depending on a sending or receiving financial
institution.
For instantaneous transactions, possible real-life applications include supply chain in drop-shipping, man-
ufacturing management, insurance claim payment process, tax collection processes, and many others. The
existing models are not well-suited for our daily use on such applications, and this inspired us of a new
stablecoin.
4.2 Currency conversion problem
We may encounter situations of needing to exchange boxdollar (BXD) to some other fiat currency (possibly
to multiple currencies) – observation of nontrivial movement in exchange rates, our market participants’
requests, and/or regular portfolio (multicurrency accounts) rebalancing, etc. When it comes to currency
exchange, the loss of stabilization is what we’re most concerned about. This means we should always
maximize the USD value (i.e., the amount of BXD) of desired positions in converting to other currencies.
It is very important that we obtain the best currency conversion strategy to keep up with our stable Box
Dollar models. Such currency conversion problems (with possibility of arbitrage detection) are well known
in operations research literature.
In what follows, we present optimization problems suitable to rebalance the combination of multinational
currencies. Their optimal solutions (i.e., optimal weights on currencies) will be employed for a conversion
problem. Note that currency rebalancing will take place only if there is a guaranteed capital gain.
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BXD matching
Figure 13: Stable Coin System Topology - BXD matching with fiat currencies: CNY (red), JPY (yellow),
KRW (blue), HK$ (green), NT$ (purple)
4.3 Currency rebalancing – Kataoka’s Problem: the safety first model
Typically random variables appear only on the right hand sides of constraints of stochastic program. The
following problem was formulated by Kataoka (1963) and it has stochastic constraints where their technology
matrix has random variables. Many real life applications can be solved, but we restrict ourselves to our
problem in this paper. Let xi denote the weight of the ith currency,i = 1, . . . , n and the random vector
ξ consists of components meaning the return on holding the corresponding currency. Our model is the
following:
max d
subject to
P
(
n∑
i=1
ξixi ≥ d
)
≥ p∑n
i=1 xi = 1, x ≥ 0,
(17)
where we assume that ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn)
T has an n-variate normal distribution with
µi = E(ξi), i = 1, . . . , n, µ = (µ1, . . . , µn)
T ,
C = E(ξ − µ)(ξ − µ)T .
Note that p and M are constants and the decision variables are x1, . . . , xn, d. Using some mathematical
steps (see, e.g., Pre´kopa (2003)) the formulation (17) can be written up as
max
{
µTx+ Φ−1(1− p)
√
xTCx
}
subject to∑n
i=1 xi = 1, x ≥ 0.
(18)
Since C is a positive semidefinite matrix, the function
√
xTCx is convex. When the probability level is set
p ≥ 0.5 (i.e., Φ−1(1−p) ≤ 0), the objective function is concave so (18) turns out to be a convex programming
problem.
4.4 Currency rebalancing – Conditional Value-at-Risk, i.e., minimization of risk
Optimization problems using Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) have been researched and used in practice,
so allow us to present the formulation of CVaR. We recommend the readers to the literature, e.g., Pflug
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(2000), Pre´kopa and Lee (2018), Uryasev and Rockafellar (2000) and the references therein. In order to find
the optimal portfolio using the classical CVaR, let ξ denote the loss vector and x the currency weights (the
decision vector) for a portfolio of n currencies. Then ξTx means the loss of the currency holding, and the
following model can be written:
min
x,a
(
a+
1
1− pE
(
[ξTx− a]+
))
subject to µTx ≤ µ0
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 1
x ≥ 0,
(19)
where µ = E(ξ) and µ0 is some constant. Note that a = VaRp(X) at optimality and the optimal objec-
tive value is the smallest among all values of E
(
ξTx | ξTx ≥ VaRp(ξTx)
)
with x in the feasible set of the
constraints. Also note that we can write µ0 = −R where R means the minimum required return for the
portfolio.
It is well known that the following LP is a discrete version of (19) with µ0 = −R,
min a+
1
K(1− p)
K∑
k=1
uk
subject to a− xTyk + uk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K
uk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K
−xTµ ≥ R∑n
i=1 xi ≤ 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
(20)
where {y1, . . . ,yK} denotes K i.i.d. samples of the loss random vector ξ ∈ Rn. (20) can equivalently be
written in the following matrix notation:
min a+
1
K(1− p)
K∑
k=1
uk
subject to 1K −Y IK0 −µT 0 . . . 0
0 −1Tn 0 . . . 0
 ax
u
 ≥
 0R
−1

u ≥ 0, x ≥ 0,
(21)
where IK means K×K identity matrix, Y is a K×n matrix with samples of the loss random vector ξ ∈ Rn,
and 1K is a K × 1 all ones vector.
4.5 More general formulations
Let x denote the vector of currency weights with its related cost vector c, and ξ the random vector with an
estimated distribution; the matrices A and T are present and future constraints, respectively. Then a more
general stochastic programming model is formulated in the following way:
min cTx
subject to Ax = b, x ≥ 0
P (Tx ≥ ξ) ≥ p,
(22)
where p is a fixed probability chosen by ourselves. In practice p is near 1, for example we may choose p as
0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, depending on our reliability requirement, i.e., in what proportion of the cases do we want
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the inequality Tx ≥ ξ to be satisfied. Let Ti denote the ith row of matrix T and ξi the ith component of
random vector ξ.
There is a simplification possibility for the problem (22). Instead of P (Tx ≥ ξ) ≥ p we take
E(ξi − Tix | ξi − Tix > 0) ≤ di, i = 1, . . . , r.
If the function gi(z) = E(ξi − z | ξi − z > 0) is decreasing, then gi(Tix) = E(ξi − Tix | ξi − Tix > 0) ≤ di is
equivalent to Tix ≥ g−1i (di), i = 1, . . . , r and the whole problem becomes:
min cTx
subject to Ax = b, x ≥ 0
Tix ≥ g−1i (di), i = 1, . . . , r,
(23)
which is an LP.
Remark 29 (Related measures of violation). In reliabiility theory and insurance problems E(ξ−t | ξ−t > 0)
is called “Expected Residual Lifetime.” It is natural that it is a decreasing function of t, but it is not always
decreasing. (i.e., there are probability distributions for which it is not true, e.g., lognormal, Pareto if t ≥ 1,
etc.) If ξ has a logconcave p.d.f., then E(ξ − t | ξ − t > 0) is a decreasing function of t.
Note that the problem (22) is a special case of the following general formulation:
minh(x)
subject to
h0(x) = P (g1(x, ξ) ≥ 0, . . . , gr(x, ξ) ≥ 0) ≥ p0
h1(x) ≥ p1, . . . , hm(x) ≥ pm,
(24)
where x is the decision vector, ξ is a random vector, h(x), h1(x), . . . , hm(x) are given functions, 0 < p0 ≤
1, p1, . . . , pm are given numbers.
Remark 30 (Convexity of the problem (24)). Any logconcave function is quasi-concave, hence if ξ ∈ Rr
has a continuous distribution and logconcave density then h0(x) in problem (24) is quasi-concave. Hence,
h0(x) allows for the convex programming property. If the objective function h is convex and we assume that
h1, . . . , hm are quasi-concave, then the problem is indeed convex.
Remark 31. If the random vector ξ has independent components ξ1, . . . , ξr, then
P (Tx ≥ ξ) =
r∏
i=1
P (Tix ≥ ξi) =
r∏
i=1
Fi(Tix), (25)
where Fi is the c.d.f. of ξi for i = 1, . . . , r. The probabilistic constraint takes the form:
r∏
i=1
Fi(Tix) ≥ p. (26)
x is feasible if this inequality, in addition to Ax = b, x ≥ 0, is satisfied.
Note that a variety of optimization applications can be found in Pre´kopa (1995) and the author’s numerous
excellent scientific articles.
27
4.6 Valuation of boxdollar
The value of boxdollar (B0) is initially pegged against a fiat currency (M0) held in the custodian vault. The
deposited collateral will generate interest (r). Thus, according to the cost-of-carry theory, an arbitrage-free
condition entails transfer of interest to the users of boxdollar, otherwise boxdollar will be discounted as much
as to compensate for opportunity costs as follows:
B0 =M0 =⇒ Bt = ertM0. (27)
However, as the users of boxdollar benefit from its convenience, the yield of convenience (δ) can partially or
utterly defray foregone interest rate or opportunity costs. In that case, the value of boxdollar in the future
(Bt) can maintain the initially pegged amount (M0) as such:
B0 =M0 =⇒ Bt = e(r−δ)tM0 ≈M0 if δ ≈ r. (28)
4.7 Boxdollar as a regional currency and a quasi-fiat money
Boxdollar can be used as a regional currency with collateral on tax revenues. This way, the regional govern-
ment can wield a multiplier effect for increased transactions of goods and services in the community. The key
to succeeding a liquid, well-trusted local money lies in the trust among community members and the eventual
guarantee of conversion to the fiat currency by the local government. In a well-coordinated game-theoretic
setting the agreement among economic agents can create value, as the local currency can boost the regional
economy as an “outside” money (Goodhart (1989)). A municipality with stable tax revenues can be a ideal
place to adopt a cryptocurrency as its local currency. For example, Ithaca, NY–where “Ithaca hours” is
circulated as a local money for shopping in local stores–can consider converting the conventional, note-based
hours into a cryptocurrency for wider and frictionless usages. Those local governments with liquid, local
cryptocurrencies can later enter into mutual agreements to render their currencies compatible. As mutual
trust grows and strengthens, the locally and inter-municipally used cryptocurrencies can become a quasi-fiat
money across the nation.
Suspicions as per whether a cryptocurrency can become a fiat money is not a new question as the history
of finance has witnessed analogous events throughout the time. DLTs utilizing computers scattered around
the globe to revise the same list of transactions appeal to finance’s fundamental objective of ascertaining a
transaction between two mutually-remote parties trustworthy to each other. The predecessors of DLTs have
done similarly as banks in England established a clearinghouse in the late 18th Century to revamp the system
of managing different ledgers of common transactions (Kindleberger (2015)). These banks issued new bank
notes (“wagon-way through the air”) based on the collateral of gold coins (“earth-bound highway”, Smith
(1776)). In another latter century, those who wanted to supply more money (“currency school”) clashed
with their counterpart whose policy goal was to put the gushing bank notes on hold (“banking school”),
which was a precursor of “forking” on cryptocurrencies.
Through trials and errors, inflation control as the foremost policy target of central banking has confirmed
a general equilibrium-theoretic prediction of the role of money as a nume´raire of the modern economy such
that goods and services can be valued at their absolute prices, not the relative prices or exchange ratios of
a batter economy. Governance is the key to maintaining the banking system based on a currency. For a fiat
money, it is the role of the central bank to grant undoubting trust on the money as a medium of payment
and exchange, and a store of value. For a cryptocurrency, the governance of its ecosystem is the protocol of
transaction confirmation. For our dual ledger-keeping boxchain, its “2+2” doubly-secure consensus protocol
is the crux of governance or security which emboldens trust among the participants across the system of
utility and incentives.
4.8 The dual cryptocurrencies: boxcoin and boxdollar in the value chain
Boxdollar, a stablecoin will be used primarily as a medium of exchange. The participants will exchange
their local fiat currencies to boxdollar based on a real time conversion rate to USD. This is quite simple
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but strong enough to obtain desirable level of trust and security – one can put down a deposit with a US
Dollar for every boxdollar issued (i.e., 1 to 1) so that the boxdollar is asset backed and keeps its stability.
There will be a unique and efficient digital wallet, called the boxpay-wallet. Using the boxpay-wallet, the
market participants will see all previous transactions, conversion records, and current balances of boxdollar
and boxcoin. If registered, fiat currencies in his or her bank accounts can be seen as well. The real time
exchange rates of boxdollar to boxcoin, boxcoin to boxdollar and ones among all related fiat currencies are
also presented on the boxpay-wallet.
The boxpay protocol consists of the most efficient dual currencies – boxcoin and boxdollar on public and
private networks, respectively. In what follows we list up some of the notable functions of boxdollar and
boxcoin. Boxdollar has the following desirable features:
• Reliability and security
• Medium of exchange
• Store of value
• Diversification of currency holdings
• Transferability (e.g., efficient transfer (cross-border) in P2P transactions, among merchants and cus-
tomers, etc.)
• Tracking all previous transactions
Boxcoin is mainly for making micropayment on public network (see Section 2 for details). There are
some specifics for the use of boxcoin, the key functions and benefits of boxcoin include the following:
• Rewards and Fees (as presented in Section 2.4.3)
• Possibility of capital appreciation
Let’s see from a standpoint of a buyer, say Alice. After she exchanged her local currency to boxdollar
(BXD) (based on a conversion rate to a USD), the calculated amount of BXDs will be stored in her boxpay-
wallet and be ready to use. If Alice wants to use her local currency Chinese Yuan (CNY) to buy an item
priced at BXD 500, first thing to do is to spend CNY 3,440 to receive BXD 500 into her boxpay-wallet.
(Buying 1 US dollar for Chinese Yuan requires CNY 6.88 using the conversion rates as of 1 PM (UTC
-4), 8/14/18.) Note that it might be a good idea to put down more CNY to get more BXD if the USD
appreciation is expected. (For example, the rate 1 USD = CNY 6.88 at the moment may later be changed
to 1 USD > CNY 6.88. It’s been a while the USD gets more valuable compared to the other currencies.)
She may have multiple items in her to-buy list even if she does not want to buy them at the moment. After
transaction completed the seller will be able to see the BXDs from the boxpay-wallet, ready to use in the
e-marketplace (e.g., for shipping cost) or get an exchange for some local fiat currency (or multiple currencies)
as needed.
Remark 32 (The boxpay wallet and smart insurance). The boxpay wallet is now being developed, and is a
file (a simple database) of the digital keys, which are completely independent of the protocol. This will come
with a smart insurance capability, systematically identifying claims to report.
5 Concluding remark
We are in transition to a cashless society and, for quite some time, blockchain has been around as one of
the most thriving technologies with a bright future ahead. Blockchain is a decentralized-distributed system
which has revolutionized our perspective of the world. Many forms of digital currency have already been
used in a variety of ways and places, e.g., in the online marketplaces and mobile banking systems, where it
is now normal to use a phone number or an email address instead of a bank account. Although there are
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numerous benefits the digital currency has to offer, many cryptocurrencies have very low trading volumes as
they failed to build their own ecosystem.
In this paper we introduce our new way of thinking on approach to DLT – the dual ledger-keeping
algorithm of the chain of antichains (boxchain). Our DLT uses the original transactions occurred in the
DAG-based primal space. Using the dual ledger-keeping algorithm a chain of antichains is constructed in
real time in the dual layer that synchronously reflects transactions in the DAG. This chain of antichains has
resembles the structure of blockchain. Using such dual-layer framework, we take desirable aspects from both
blockchain and a DAG-based distributed network system. We consequently arrive at a powerful consensus
protocol which makes the final confirmation feasible with great efficiency. Our dual approach proposes
two distinct cryptocurrencies: boxdollar and boxcoin. Our stablecoin boxdollar is pegged to a fiat money,
anticipating the use as a medium-of-exchange as well as a reliable store-of-value. Another cryptocurrency,
called boxcoin, is a crucial component to keep up a purely distributed peer-to-peer network, with capability
to run our unique incentive system at its core, indispensable to an effective DLT.
We presented both deterministic and stochastic aspects of the dual ledger-keeping. Illustrative and nu-
merical examples are also presented. Our new algorithms were discovered by the use of discrete mathematics
as well as probability models. This paper is focused on the mathematical and analytical foundations of a
new digital ecosystem. We hope our new ideas for DLT will be beneficial to the readers and be helpful to
improve decentralized-distributed network systems and their real-life applications.
6 Acknowledgements
The authors would like to express sincere gratitude to Professor Endre Boros for his kind critics, which
inspired the authors to come up with a consensus algorithm. The authors would also like to thank the
Box Protocol team for their comments and suggestions. The first author dearly misses his academic father
Professor Andra´s Pre´kopa (1929-2016). We also thank Daeje Chin and Joung Hwa Choi.
References
Baird, L. 2016. Hashgraph consensus: fair, fast, byzantine fault tolerance. Swirlds Tech Report TR-2016-01.
Bowers, N. L. Jr., H. U. Gerber, J. C. Hickman, D. A. Jones, C. J. Nesbitt. 1997. Actuarial Mathematics. The society
of Actuaries, Schaumburg, Illinois.
Churyumov, Anton. 2017. Byteball: A decentralized system for storage and transfer of value. URL http://byteball.
org.
Dickson, D. C. M. 1995. A review of Panjer’s recursion formula and its applications. British Actuarial Journal 1(1)
107–124.
Dilworth, R. P. 1950. A decomposition theorem for partially ordered sets. Ann. of Math. 51(1) 161–166.
Dilworth, R. P. 1960. Some combinatorial problems on partially ordered sets. Proc. AMS Sympos. Appl. Math. 10
85–90.
Fulkerson, D.R. 1956. A note on Dilworth’s theorem for partially ordered sets. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 7 701.
Goodhart, C.A.E. 1989. Money, information and uncertainty . London: Macmillan, 2nd Ed.
Greene, C., D. Kleitman. 1976. The structure of Sperner k-family. J. Combinatorial Theory Ser. A 20 80–88.
Greenwood, M., G.U. Yule. 1920. An inquiry into the nature of frequency distributions representative of multiple
happenings with particular reference to the occurrence of multiple attacks of disease or of repeated accidents.
Journal of Royal Stat. Soc. 83(2) 255–279.
Iota. 2016. A crytocurrency for internet-of-things. URL http://www.iotatoken.com.
Kataoka, S. 1963. A stochastic programming model. Econometrica 31 181–196.
Kindleberger, C.P. 2015. A financial history of Western Europe. Routledge.
Lee, J. 2017. Computing the probability of union in the n-dimensional Euclidean space for application of the
multivariate quantile: p-level efficient points. Oper. Res. Lett. 45 242–247.
30
Lee, J., J. Kim, A. Pre´kopa. 2017. Extreme value estimation for a function of a random sample using binomial
moment scheme and Boolean functions of events. Discrete Appl. Math. 219(11) 210–218.
Lee, J., A. Pre´kopa. 2017. On the probability of union in the n-space. Oper. Res. Lett 45 19–24.
Lerner, Sergio Demian. 2015. Dagcoin: a crytocurrency without blocks. URL http://bitslog.wordpress.com/2015/
09/11/dagcoin.
Nakamoto, S. 2008. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. URL http://www.bitocin.org.
NXTFORUM.ORG, PEOPLE ON. 2014. Dag, a generalized blockchain. URL http://nxtforum.org/
proof-of-stake-algorithm/dag-a-generalized-blockchain/.
Panjer, H. 1981. Recursive evaluation of a family of compound distributions. AST IN Bulletin 12 21–26.
Panjer, H., B. Lutek. 1983. Practical aspects of stop-loss calculations. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 1
159–177.
Panjer, H., G.E. Willmot. 1986. Computational aspects of recursive evaluation of compound distributions. Insurance:
Mathematics and Economics 5 113–116.
Pflug, G. Ch. 2000. Some remarks on the value-at-risk and conditional value at risk. Probabilistic Constrained Optim.
272–281.
Pflug, Georg Ch. 1996. Optimization of stochastic models - the interface between simulation and optimization. Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Popov, Serguei. 2017. The tangle. URL http://www.iotatoken.com.
Pre´kopa, A. 1995. Stochastic programming . Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Pre´kopa, A. 2003. Probabilistic programming. Hand books in Operations Research and Management Science
(Ruszczyn´ski, A. and Shapiro, A., Eds.) 10 267–351.
Pre´kopa, A., J. Lee. 2018. Risk tomography. Eur J Oper Res 265(1) 149–168.
Shapiro, A., D. Dentcheva, A. Ruszczyn´ski. 2009. Lectures on stochastic programming: modeling and theory . SIAM
and MPS, Philadelphia.
Smith, A. 1776. An inquiry into the wealth of nations. W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London.
Uryasev, S., R.T. Rockafellar. 2000. Optimization of conditional value at risk. J. Risk 2 21–41.
31
